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Plato, Gorgias , and Trickster:
Seeking Rhetoric's Muse
Keith Rhodes

We should never forget that in any psychological discussion
we are not saying something about the psyche,
but that the psyche is always speaking about itself.

C. G. Jung

Introduction: Trickster's Place in Archetypal Rhetoric

ung ' s vision of a "collective unconscious," where metaphorical "archetypes"

J perform their shadowy dramas on a figurative sub-stage of consciousness, has

a natural application to the history of ideas. These deep forces, operating simi
larly in human minds across space, time, and even cultures, can account interest
ingly well for the persistence of certain modes of human thought-as l iterary
critics like Northrop Frye have amply demonstrated. Eventually, I hope to argue
that the Trickster archetype, one of Jung's most puzzling figures, bears a spec ial,
even integral relationship to the theory and practice of rhetoric. Indeed, as part
of this argument I mean to claim that, for rhetoric, archetypal analysis is far from
being j ust another theoretical lens. Rhetoric, as a consequence of its integral re
lationship with the Trickster archetype, might be seen as itself an essentially ar
chetypal practice-one that is most centrally about playing out a specific role in
our collective psychological drama. Whatever may be the wider range of pos
sible approaches to composition theory and practice, to take a rhetorical attitude
toward writing may be nothing more or less than to i nvoke a Trickster muse.
Certainly, that may claim too much ; but let us examine the evidence at length,
and then come back to this notion.
First, we must turn our attention to the Trickster itself. Originally, the Trick
ster archetype received scant direct attention from Jung himself. This can seem
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strange, since Trickster is a prominent character in one of Jung's most central
psychic constellations. That is, Trickster is to the Shadow as Hero is to the Ego.
Just as Hero i s the collective figure manifested i n the individual Ego, Trickster
is the collective figure manifested in the individual S hadow (Jacobi , 1 97 3 ,
p p . 1 09- 1 1 5 ; Jung, 1 980, p. 262). O n e reason Trickster c a n escape attention, of
course, is that it collects together material that the contemporary psyche tries to
put behind i t . Tri ckster is the dark cloud made of e veryth i n g bestial and
unconscious that literate, Heroic humanity struggles to leave behind. Historical
and soc ial forces have generated the S el f as a more humane and fully differenti
ated state of psychic being. The more primal material that collects i nto Trickster
thus retreats from view as the more S elf-ish Hero ri ses to become the most
prom i n e n tl y manife s ted collective archetype. There is danger, though, in
pretending that the struggle can ever truly end. If the relatively Heroic proj ect of
Jungian archetypal theorizing itself does not also contain Trickster ' s continuing
i n fluence within the psyche, that proj ec t will suffer the usual, dire fate of overly
proud Heroes who ignore the deeper gods.
Hence, i t would be quite literally a tragedy if those who are interested i n the
project of exploring connections between archetypal theories and rhetoric should
ignore Hero 's older, quieter partner. Indeed, there may be a particular value in
discussing Trickster within the context of applying archetypes to rhetoric and
writing. Trickster sets useful problems before the psyche and then offers arcane
resources by which the psyche may resolve these riddles, helping the Heroic ego
along the path toward fuller psychic integration. It may be that, just so, rhetori
cal theorists inform largely Heroic writing teachers, enabling teachers i n turn to
empower largely Heroic writers ; and so we also should expect to find Trickster
prominently involved i n the transaction between rhetoricians and those who learn
from them.
If I come not to bury Trickster, though, neither do I come, exactly, to praise
such a figure. It would be a grossly mistaken use of Jungian theory to attempt to
"liberate" the Shadow or the Trickster, to dream of some impossible unification
of conscious and unconscious processes. Trickster has a dangerous siren call,
promising to reveal to us the true life of the body, the legacy of evolutionary
forces brought to bear upon a primate that was once not yet verbal. But there is
no real hope of going back across the Rubicon of language to recover the roots of
a n "essential" embodied reality. Nor is there any real hope, postmodernism
notwith standing, of freeing the intellect from the body and i ts evolutionary
inheritance, creating a new Empire of mind. Trickster is impossible to ignore,
then, but it i s also beyond hope of redemption. To play on my previous cultural
references, we are "Caesarean," irremedially Heroic Selves, torn from the womb
of nature by human artifice. As such, we neither can nor should fully inhabit the
role Trickster offers.
Thus, to align rhetoricians with Trickster, as I will seek to do, is not
immediately to call for a higher valuation of Trickster. Trickster's value lies not
so much i n what it is in itself as in what it does for Hero. Trickster brings to
consciousness what Hero, intent on its quest, intentionally forgets: that ultimately
the conscious ego is not a thing apart from the psychic vastness it seeks to con
trol. Like a Shakespearean fool, Trickster has a maddening usefulness for those
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who wiii listen. Trickster deflates hubris and reveals the complicity o f Heroic
individual action in larger unconscious and transpersonal dramas. Within the vast
historical movement toward fui i y conscious human literacy, rhetoric has played
the Fool, being maddeningly useful relative to the more straightforward Heroic
que st of philosophers and other rationalists.
These days, though, rhetoricians (and others whose works have been drawn
in to the rhetorical canon) may remain maddening, but their usefulness has faJlen
into question. As Stephen North ( 1 987) explains, teaching practitioners are largely
out of touch with the work of rhetorical theorists-and sometimes defiantly so.
Buried in often slavish conditions, many composition teachers who would value
theoretical discussions are simply unable to take the time to participate i n them.
Indeed, even where rhetorical theorists ' views are used, it seems often to be a
matter of the brute coercion of relati vely powerless graduate assistants and
adjunct instructors by academicaJly empowered theorists who control composi
tion curriculum and other institutional processes. Further, reviewing scholarship
in the field of modern rhetoric, i t becomes quite clear that a rationalist sort of
Heroism i s at work i n the over-ail paradigm of its production. If there are signifi
cant numbers of rhetoricians who are practicing the Tricksterish arts of being
witty, troublesome, maddening, or seemingly foolish in service of profundity,
most are not being published regularly. Instead, theoretical scholarship is almost
unrelentingly earnest and deferen tial to authorities, even when extoJiing the
virtues of "anti-foundationalist" theories. Scholarly camps within rhetoric seem
to have become monarchies without Fools-a tragedy i n the making if seen with
an archetypal eye.
Rhetoric seems i n dire need of applying Trickste r ' s healing attention to its
own processes, then ; and as the discipline has intuited, one source of possible
healing lies in examining its own history. Of particular interest has been the his
tory of rhetoric i n classical times, when rhetoric shifted its nature quickly and
permanently. Once simply the practice of effective utterance, rhetoric became,
especially i n the hands of Aristotle, the practice of shaping utterance-a more
completely conscious practice. This development i n the h istory of rhetoric is
clearly analogous to the generation of ego out of a previously undifferentiated
psyche i n the creation of self-consciousness. The generation o f ego in turn con
verts Trickster into an archetype, a personal psychic replacement for the tribal
shamans who served Trickster's role in earlier stages of more rudimentary psy
chic integration (Jung, 1 980, pp. 466-472). Thus, there may be synchronicity at
work in the history of rhetoric, such that an examination of rhetoric ' s emergence
as a conscious practice might illustrate Trickster's dialectical value to rhetoric
and to writing pedagogy.
Examining the Origin Myths of Rhetoric

Rhetoric's roots typically have been rendered rather more as myth than as
history; and, since these myths are commonly known, I will not "blame" any
myth on any cited source. The old myth of rhetoric starts with Corax and his
student Tisi as-respectively the first to discover and the first to learn a reliable
art of speaking effectively-honing their skills in the emergent democracy of
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Syracuse, i n Sicily. As the story goes, Tisias and his own student, Gorgias,
made an emissary to Athens on behalf o f Syracuse, and Athenians fell i n love
with the sweet nothings that Gorgias delivered so well. This ushered i n the age of
the " S o p h i s t s , " a band of g i fted, s i l ver- tongued c harlatan s . A fter Plato ' s
withering critique o f these Sophists, Aristotle finally regularized rhetoric by
establishing it on a sound, ethical, and rationalist base. This myth has had a long
and stable history, and retains a great deal of currency i n our culture-whatever
its inaccuracies.
Lately, though, a new myth of rhetoric's origins has been taking shape. The
new myth rehabilitates the S ophists, finding in their slipperiness somewhat
less of artful cynicism and somewhat more of legitimate skepticism. S till, if the
Sophists were the first to find "social constructionism," apparently it was largely
an accidental accomplishment on their part and came to little in their hands. As
proof o f this, we find i n this new myth that the S ophists were unable to prevail
over the reactionary efforts of Plato, paving the way for Aristotle to implant his
rationalistic paradigm into the consciousness of the centuries i n between then
and now. It is important to point out that Plato and Aristotle, the key figures i n
t h e old origin myth, remain the k e y h istorical figures within t h e n e w myth. In
one sense, this is hardly surprising. Given that we have many hundreds of pages
of works by Plato and Aristotle and only a few fragments of the works of the
Sophists, traditionally Heroic scholarly work on the Sophists themselves is
inherently limited. This i s particularly true within the rational-ideal paradigm
carried forward unreflectively i n the hierarchical and traditional genre conven
tions still used by most scholars of the "new myth," who apparently remain
Aristotelians despite themselves.
Of course, Plato's reputation has not always come out well i n either myth.
Indeed, esteem for Plato seems always to be less than absolute. Within the old
myth, Plato ' s flaws-for instance, his lack of thematic coherence i n works such
as the Phaedrus and the Protagoras-always required some rationalization. In
recent times, though, esteem for Plato has become much more problematic.
Indeed, the project known as the "rehabilitation of the Sophists" could, at least
by volume of discussion, be cast more readily as the dehabilitation of Plato. At
best for Plato, William Covino's casting of him as a "wondering star-gazer"
reduces Plato to simply one of several who have urged a view of "rhetoric and
writing and reading as play with an expanding horizon" ( 1 98 8 , p. 2 1 ). At worst
for Plato, Jasper Nee! ( 1 988) casts him as the scourge of civilization, a deviously
successful millennia! politician who redirected the course of history, to our great
disadvantage, through an intentional abuse of the rhetoric o f narrative. Some
where i n between i s a Derridean view (according to Nee!, at least) of Plato as a
flawed figure valuable primarily for what a good deconstruction of his work might
reveal (Nee! , 1 98 8 , pp. 1 40-20 1 ) . What recent critics of Plato share with older,
gentler treatments, though, is a tendency to write extensively about Plato at the
expense of writing very much about the Sophists. Even Nee!, who complains
persuasively that the very worst thing Plato did was to obscure the ideas of the
Sophists, devotes only a brief final chapter, l ittle more than a post-script, to the
Sophists ' ideas themselves.
It seems a rather odd move, this attempt to dehabilitate Plato by featuring
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his thought i n both the content and title of one's work; and here I am, seeming to
do the same thing. Perhaps it is time to go beneath these myths to find new ones.
A Trickster Myth of Rhetoric

Richard Leo Enos ( 1 993) has carefully verified that Empedocles, the mystic
S icil ian philosopher, has a serious claim to be the most important source (if not
the founder itself) of rhetoric as a conscious discipline. Enos demonstrates the
lik elihood that Corax, Ti s i a s , and G o rg i a s forwarded an art sprung fro m
Empedocles' thoughtful understanding of the meaning and effect of language. As
the standard myth holds, this art was affected by the need for persuasive arts in
Syracusean democracy; yet i t had other sources that were both deeper and more
conscious. In other words, Gorgias did not merely know the practice of persua
sion and artful speaking, enhanced by a few handy tricks. Instead, Gorgias is
likely to have known a fully philosophical and theoretical practice of rhetoric, a
practice of the sort that earlier mythologies of rhetoric traditionally reserve for
elucidation by Aristotle.
Further, Empedocles' own understanding was not an accident of genius or
inspiration, whatever his own claims. According to Freido Rieken's ( 1 99 1 ) use
fully compressed exposition, the Hellenic/Ionian world as a whole had partici
pated actively i n a philosophical movement which had already been through three
distinct stages of growth by the time Gorgias and Socrates initiated a fourth. This
highly secular and scientific philosophical tradition opposed itself to the belief
in animistic gods that, if not genuinely philosophical, was certainly the first
step away from a purely physical human existence into the generation of psycho
logical life.
In the first genuinely philosophical stage of this psychological process,
originating i n the Asia Minor port of Miletus i n the seventh century B.C.E., Thales
and others sought rational explanations for mysterious matters generally attrib
uted to gods-matters such as, on the one hand, "objective" earthquakes, and, on
the other, "subjective" passions. This first stage appears to have lasted until about
the start of the fifth century B.C.E. In the second stage, much more dispersed but
thriving most fully i n the southern Italian city of Elea, Parmenides and others
eventually discovered that pure rationalism founders in irreconcilable dualisms
like "changeless change." I n the closely following third stage, more pragmatic
philosophers, including Zeno of Elea and Empedocles, tried to reconcile the in
sights of rationality with empirical observations. Like the second stage, this third
stage was widely dispersed. S till, following the leading influence of the second
stage philosopher Anaxagoras (originally from Asia Minor) over the Athenian
ruler Pericles, the fourth, Socratic stage of this philosophical movement eventu
ally became centered i n Athens.
Before this time, Athens seems to have been a backwater of philosophic
exploration; and, as Enos demonstrates, S icily had been one of philosophy's real
hot-beds. Interestingly, Democritus, another leading light in the latter part of
"third stage" philosophy, came from Abdera, i n Thrace. Abdera, of course, was
the original home of Protagoras, the only real peer of Gorgias i n the first Athe
nian Sophistic. Thus, contrary to likely assumptions within the earlier myths,
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Gorgias and possibly even Protagoras-and hence the Sophistic movement-came
from regions that most likely outstripped Socrates' Athens in the depth of their
philosophical traditions.
Meanwhile, as Enos most centrally demonstrates, running through all of
this history, influencing both Athens and Sicily, was the hypnagogic tradition of
the Homeric rhapsodes . Plato asserts i n his Ion that the rhapsodic tradition was
one of "mere" divine i nspiration, and not a genuine art ( 1 9 6 1 , pp. 2 1 6-228) .
Importantly, w e c a n suspect t h a t Gorgias would differ. The dispute between
Socrates and Gorgias most likely was not one between philosophy and rhetoric
but one between differing attitudes toward the place of the irrational in a study of
language. Socrates, harking back to deistic and rationalistic thinking that the
philosophic tradition had left behind in earlier, non-Athenian stages, appears to
have seen language as a mere device, used at its best in service of e ither gods or
abstract rationality. Gorgias, following Empedocles, most likely saw l anguage as
a fully human phenomenon always combining irrational and rational components,
either component being a legitimate subject of practical inquiry. In other words,
the apparent dispute between Socrates and Gorgias, reading both with and against
Plato here, may have been between a naive, naturalistic philosophy and a more
mature, rhetoricized philosophy.
To further elucidate this important difference, I need to add a prominent and
well-known historical element that Enos rather curiously omits from his review:
the i nterplay of shamanism with the philosophy of the time, and particularly with
the philosophy of Empedocles. We should pause to recall, first, that Trickster's
advent and the fall of shamanism are necessary complements i n Jung's theories.
Shamanic cultures still have their external Tricksters; only post-shamanic minds
need the internalized archetypal entity as a regular part of their internal narra
tives. Further, the internalization of the Trickster archetype and the demise of
shamans were an integral part of this important transitional time in the history of
the West. Empedocles was still quite heavily influenced by shamanic ideas and
practices (Dodds, 1 95 1 , pp. 1 45 - 1 47 ) , an influence that makes sense within a
Jungian framework. That is, as the psyche began to disassociate itself from the
body, at first i t fell to a god-like but tangible figure, the shaman, to represent the
repressed body to consc iousness. By the time of Empedocles, tangibility and
divinity had become partially detached, with Empedocles only vaguely indicat
ing his possible divinity and claiming mostly to have access to a Muse who could
tell divine truths (Freeman, 1 97 1 , p. 5 1 ).
Gorgias and Socrates seem to be at last the bearers of differentiated psyches,
individuals who claim most of their creative powers for themselves as those natural
to a mortal being. This is the beginning of the sort of psyche in which the
Trickster archetype could at last manifest itself as the sort of generative muse
moderns would be willing to credit as a psychological phenomenon. While
Socrates and Gorgias made use of this same phenomenon, there might be a highly
significant difference between their visions of its nature. The famous charioteer
metaphor from the Phaedrus exquisitely captures the Socratic attitude toward
Tric k ster, the shadow, and the body. A l l three are c l early repre s e n ted by
the unruly black horse, the one that seeks to bring the chariot to the ground.
The Heroic white horse seeks, as Heroes will, to escape the earth, to fly to the
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ethereal heavens. To Plato ' s Socrates, the answer seems simple: whip the black
horse into submission so that the chariot might soar. To give Socrates his due, of
course, he does not advise getting rid of the black horse, and ultimately his
metaphor must be seen as proposing a version of dialectic. Further, certainly
neither Socrates nor Gorgias can be held to the standard of having a conscious
understanding of the archetypal implications of their work. S till, Gorgias can be
seen as providing a more practical alternative: the alternative of accepting the
maddening usefulness of Trickster i n helping the ego toward a fuller integration
of all of its possibilities.
Gorgias i s notorious for two works which, I would contend, are misinter
preted unless seen as attempts to be maddeningly useful i n Tricksterish fashion.
In the "Encomium of Helen," Gorgias reveals the troubling incommensurability
between the concepts of fate and blame: if gods and fate rule humanity, Helen of
Troy can hardly be blamed for doing as the gods required and thereby launching
the Troj an War. Of course, readers of a rationalist bent could conclude that
Gorgias actually meant to be understood referentially, as inferring that morality
is relative and that blame was thus never possible for any human. The argument
can just as easily be seen, though, as an indirect attack on the idea of fate, a
demonstration that the ordinary conception of fate leads to intolerable ethical
contradictions.
The other of Gorgias' notorious works, reputedly titled "On Nature," has not
been preserved in its original (Freeman, 1 97 1 , pp. 1 27- 1 29), but has survived i n
part because i t s thesis is so memorably outrageous. Gorgias i s credited w i t h a
proof that, i n descending order, either nothing exists, or, if anything does exist, i t
cannot be comprehended, or, if anything can be comprehended, i t cannot be
communicated (Freeman, 1 97 1 , pp. 1 28- 1 29). Again, one who looks only at ref
erential meanings might conclude that Gorgias meant to be profoundly relativis
tic. Two other quotes from the relics of Gorgias' productions give us a clue that
something very different was at issue, however. First, Gorgias, not Aristotle, seems
to have originated the concept that "One must destroy one's adversaries' serious
ness with laughter, and their laughter with seriousness" (Freeman, 1 97 1 , p. 1 3 8).
Second, Gorgias contradicts his "nothing exists" conclusion, at least partially,
when he remarks that "Being i s unrecognizable without seeming, and seeming is
weak unless i t succeeds in being" (Freeman, 1 97 1 , p. 1 3 9). The first quotation
alone might continue to support a view of Gorgias as a nihilist, someone who
aimed only at reversal, contradiction, and making the worse case the better. The
second, however, opens up another possibility that, paradox ically, destabilizes
attempts to cast Gorgias as merely a relativist.
If one reconsiders Gorgias as someone who knew what he was doing all along,
then the idea of b e i ng and seeming having a dynamic relationship i n the
construction of reality becomes the most likely candidate for being a genuinely
referential comment. After all, despite what he said else where, Gorgias did
continue his attempts to communicate and did prize material aspects of exist
ence. The idea of laughing at the seriousness of one's adversaries, in this light,
becomes the key to interpreting the playfulness of seeming to attack blame while
actually undercutting the theology of fate, or of seeming to commun icate the
idea that ideas cannot be communicated. In other words, Gorgias was not being
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Heroically referential, nor was he being merely contrar i a n ; he was being
maddeningly useful, following the Tricksterish way with a purity all the more
astonishing for being without reference to Jung's legitimating theories.
This i nterpretation of Gorgias' works makes even more sense when Gorgias
is seen as informed by trends in the philosophical tradition in which he clearly
belongs. The idea that, rationally, "nothing exists" was not news to Empedocles,
much less to any of his students. That i t may have been news to most Athenians
creates the context i n which Gorgias' supposed proof becomes a spoof, a satirical
riff on provi ncial Athenian attitudes toward reference and objectivity. Even
before Gorgias there was an interesting proto-Trickster, Zeno of Elea, who did
much the same thing within the community of Hellenic/Ionian philosophers .
Zeno-a contemporary of Empedocles who worked even more closely with their
common teacher, the skeptical empiricist Parmen ides-specialized i n creating
paradoxes that revealed the lack of "seeming" value in rationalist accounts of
"being. " In the most famous of these, it i s "demonstrated" that, i n a race between
Achilles and a turtle, the speedy Achilles will lose if he starts later. That is,
logically, Achilles will only be able to make up half the distance, then half of
the remainder, then half again, and so on forever; he will never catch the turtle
because, logically, he cannot escape from eternal regression (Salmon, 1 97 1 ,
pp. 8-9). Given such obvious ribaldry (however serious its purposes) within
Gorgias's philosophical tradition, i t may be absurd i n the extreme to read Gorgias
referentially.
What, then, could Gorgias have been after? Perhaps one more quote from
the scant record of Gorgias' words holds the final key : "Tragedy, by means of
legends and emotions, creates a deception in which the deceiver is more honest
than the non-decei ver, and the deceived i s w i se r than the non-decei ved"
(Freeman, 1 97 1 , p . 1 3 8 ) . This attitude could certainly apply as well to orations
that were quite intentionally something other than they seemed to be-that were,
then, essentially dramatic and performative. In that light, Gorgias goes beyond
being merely ironic-intending, for instance, merely to produce the belief that
fate i s bad by pretending to excoriate blame i n the "Encomium of Hele n . "
I n s tead, Gorgias may well have b e e n intending something more radi c a l ,
something like a dramatic deception that leaves those w h o enter into full psychic
participation with i t wiser at some inarticulate and irrational level of being. After
all, this is what could come of musing with an archetype like Trickster, the defier
of pure mind, the bringer to earth, the harbinger of primeval processes still at
work beneath the appearance of rational transcendence.
Plato's Place in a Trickster Myth of Rhetoric

Despite Gorgias' claim to a more complete respect, Plato ' s continuing
centrality i n rhetorical discussions may well have more merit than the heroes of
the new myth want to grant (even though their actions still grant it). That is,
Plato 's openly Tricksterish craft may be more important than his rather more
Heroic referential content. The instability of Plato's referential meaning, of course,
is old news. Still, it seems impossible to choose among, for instance, Derrida's
(supposedly) earnest but deluded Plato, Covino's starry-eyed and playful Plato,
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or Neel 's masterful and dastardly Plato. For a failure, Plato certainly has been
difficult to top ; for a wonderer, Plato certainly i s heavy-handed; for a schemer,
Plato certainly does seem transparent. I would like to propose something informed
by all of these readings that renders choice among them unnecessary : Plato had
learned from all of his predecessors how to use the Trickster muse of rhetoric, a
matter which renders the issue of his personal "intent" not merely problematic,
but essentially unfathomable-and by design.
I find two clues in Plato 's work to be extremely compelling i n this regard.
First, in his Ion, Plato demonstrates his belief that art is, at its best, a "divine"
inspiration, one that necessarily comes from extra-human sources. In that work,
(harking back here to Enos' tracing of the rhapsodic roots of Gorgian rhetoric ) ,
Plato persuades I o n , a rhapsode, that h i s artistry m u s t come from inspiration rather
than technique. After all, Ion clearly does not possess the encyclopedic knowl
edge that would be necessary to generate his ability on the basis of articulable
technique. Certainly, we all know examples of artists for whom this i s true
even if now we have other e xplanations of the transpersonal agencies that
manifest themselves in spectacularly imaginative artistry. Even more to the point,
though, is Socrates' readiness to surrender to his daemon for his own creative
bursts of rhetorical art, nowhere more emphatically than i n the Phaedrus, the
most central and penetrating of Plato's dialogues on rhetoric. Indeed, i n the
Phaedrus, the third and final speech, the supposed pinnacle of truest rhetorical
art, is cast as entirely the creation of Socrates' daemon. Even if i t i s possible to
believe that Plato wanted us to see Socrates as being playful i n making this claim,
it is also possible to believe that Plato, Socrates' student, knew full well the value
of musing as a path toward the finest persuasive art.
Still, I must agree with the pervasive judgment that Plato was flawed, even
if the i nstability of the explanations of Plato' s flaws should make us all wary.
Perhaps Plato was prevented from gaining ful l mastery of this process of
musement by his seeming view that musement came from independent gods rather
than from the psyche of an ordinary, mortal language-user. On the other hand,
given his prolific and wonderfully "deceptive" (in Gorgias' sense of deceiving us
toward wisdom) theatrical art (for what else are Plato' s dialogues but theater?),
perhaps i t i s necessary to give Plato more credi t . Whatever may have been
Socrates' limitations i n regard to musement, we have evidence in the artistry of
Plato 's dialogues themselves that Plato out-mused his teacher. Indeed, even con
sidering the limitations in the available evide nce, perhaps Plato transcended all
of his teachers, including Gorgias. Perhaps by virtue of being there on the scene
at exactly the most propitious, fresh moment, Plato simply nailed the art of
musing with Trickster like nobody else ever has. If that were true, nobody would
ever be able to say for sure what had happened in Plato's work, but it would be
hard to escape its maddeningly useful effects. That certainly does seem to have
been Plato' s legacy.
Something even more significant may emerge in Plato' s work, explaining
more understandably why even Plato 's most astute critics spend so much time
considering his work. Empedocles and then Gorgias may be said to be true rheto
rician-philosophers, but Plato could mark the point zero from which primarily
Heroic philosophy and primarily Tricksterish rhetoric qiverge, as they must, into
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an archetypal dialectic. Plato may mark this separation because he introduces
a third idea c apable of interpreting rhetoric and philosophy together, hence
permitting them to be distinguished from each other. Interpreting philosophy and
rhetoric together is the work of psychology, of being neither Tricksterish nor
Heroic but interpreting both together dialectically. Plato 's millennia! power over
the entire scene of relations between rhetoric and philosophy may arise precisely
because he was neither philosopher nor rhetorician, but primarily the first
psychologist.
Still, I see no sign that Plato knew what he was doing sufficiently well to
articulate to himself the nature of this superior, psychological vantage. His er
rors remain as glaring as his potency. Further, i t seems fairly plain that rhetoric
continued to be, at its best, Tricksterish in the Gorgian sense rather than
psychological i n this potentially Platonic sense. Covino ( 1 98 8 ) may under-esti
mate the uniqueness of Plato, then, but the Tricksterish perspective supports his
contention that Aristotle, Cicero, Montaigne, Vico, and Hume continue what I
have called the Gorgian style of Tricksterish discourse, the art of intending read
ers to experie nce something other and more than the mere reproduction of refer
ential meaning. I do not need to assert that Tricksterism was the "intent" of these
and other rhetoricians, though. Rather, by e n tering into a discourse which was by
nature and tradition closely allied to the role of Trickster, these most penetrating
and relentless pursuers of rhetorical wisdom became subject, at least i n part, to
rhetoric's muse and its collectively unconscious agenda. If few of these rhetori
cians were as fully psychological (and hence fully dialectical) as Plato, neither
could any rhetorician who wrote after Plato be entirely without a psychologized
perspective-even if the perspective came from a point beneath consciousness.
In recent times, of course, there has been a change in the rhetorical tradition.
As Covino demonstrates, earnest n ineteenth century rhetoricians seem to have
succeeded in driving Trickster out of acceptable rhetorical discourse. Meanwhile,
Freud and others opened up the possibility of articulated psychological technique,
a technique that Jung brought to bear on the very source of musing. Modern
writers on rhetoric and semiotics, like Derrida, Lacan, B urke, Langer, and Eco,
are more fully aware of themselves as psychological beings. They have been able
to move beyond the mere trickery of u s i n g n o n-referential or "irrational"
language to deceive, and have begun to explore these phenomena and their
meanings in both referential and performative ways. Recent works more closely
tied to the community of academic writing teachers have taken advantage of this
new atmosphere of psychologically informed rhetoric. Writers like Stanley Fish
( 1 9 80) and Peter Elbow ( 1 97 3 ) have gone beyond mere trickery to open up
"seriously playful" methods of reading and writing. Perhaps most stunning of all
from this perspective is the insight of Helene Cixous ( 1 976) in "The Laugh of the
Medusa" that writing the embodied self could liberate unconscious resources in
rhetorically powerful ways.
In sum, i t may well be that i n this time, precisely now, a new paradigm may
be opening not only for rhetoric, but for the use of Trickster-and by logical
extension, for the psyche itself. Meanwhile, rhetorical theory and writing instruc
tion seem poised at the very edge of this new paradigm, uniquely positioned to
use it and to begin to articulate it.
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Most applications of archetypal thought to writing instruction tend (even
without intending) to establish Hero as the muse of "empowered" writers-and
by extension, the muse of teachers in their efforts to "write" an empowering class
room experience. Here, I claim i nstead that Trickster has been the most useful
muse of rhetoricians , of writers about writ i n g . This latter claim, however,
complicates matters for writing teachers . S urely, writing teachers are also
rhetoricians, "writers" and speakers about writing who intend to complicate and
support the efforts of Heroic writers in much the same way that theoretical
scholars i n tend to complicate and support the efforts of writing teachers. If the
writing teacher is both Hero and the supporter of Heroes, the demand upon
writing teachers to become impossibly wise, to be timeless and genuinely
individuated Trickster-Heroes, may be acute . The seeming impossibility of this
demand lurks within the most prominent conflicts i n composition theory, those
concerni n g how consciousness is supposed to i n teract w i th the unconscious
processing of such things as syntax, ideology, reasoning, writing processes, and
theory itself. As i n writing processes, in teaching processes there i s s i mply too
much for Heroic consciousness to manage if everything i s attempted at once.
As has been indicated above, writing teachers can take on another role, one
that mediates between Trickster and Hero : the role of psychologist of the writing
self. Shoshona Felman ( 1 987) has written with great clarity and understanding
about the application of Lacan's ideas to this project, and I mean to take nothing
away from that effort i n suggesting something else. Archetypal thinking also
enters this scene usefully, offering symbols with which to mediate between the
complex, invisible vastness of unconsciousness and the Heroic sense of individual
freedom. Moreover, Jungian psychology dares to approach what the anonymous
writer we refer to as "Longinus" long ago recognized to be the heart of rhetoric ' s
value: i t s ability t o generate writing that i s sublime, able to remind readers
viscerally of their most profound longings. Trickster 's most central role , after
all, is that of forcing Heroic egos into the conflicts out of which they may emerge
as w h a t J u n g i a n a n a l y s t J a m e s H i l l m a n c a l l s , w i th o u t apology, " s o u l s "
( 1 977, p p . i x-xvi). As Hillman points out, the rhetorical perspective on language
breaks down all attempts to c a s t the human condition as s y s tematizable,
concrete, and mechanical, and so becomes a vital aspect of the even larger
transpersonal movement of soul-making (pp . 1 42- 1 54).
This description of rhetoric as a Tricksterish discipline directly and centrally
involved i n issues of both re-embodiment and "soul-making" has an immediate
aptness when considering figures like Empedocles, Plato, Longinus, Erasmus,
Vico, or B urke. Still, it would seem to have lost a good deal of applicability
in the profession al lives of acade mic rhetoricians. Moreover, i n the current
atmosphere of institutionalized education teachers may fear and resent the risks
of rhetorical teaching as this analysis suggests it should be, something danger
ously close to psychotherapy-and a rather aggre s s i vely upsetting kind of
therapy at that.
Nevertheless, what other responsible avenue i s available? Simply to ignore
the Tricksterish aspects of rhetorical learni ng is to be at cross-purposes with the
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activity itself. Even a brief review of Jung 's metaphor of the psyche as a whole
reveals that merely cheering on the Hero i s bound to fail, for Trickster will come
along, bidden or not. Even worse, resorting to postmodern rhetoric's decidedly
Tricksterish resources without a fully psychological understanding may well be
the very model of an unwitting psychic "therapy" of a potentially dangerous sort.
Bold words-even in hyperbole-for someone who has not yet proposed a
program, I suppose. There really is not a need for a new program, though, as
much as there i s a need for better understanding of what existing programs offer.
That writing is a form of Heroic rationality in need of constant remediation
from Tricksterish irrationality lies behind nearly every recent advance in the
teac h i n g of writing, and i nforms all prac t i c e s that render these advances
genuinely advantageous. Students who have been fed a steady diet of their errors
lose the Heroic spirit; students who have been given a steady diet of rational
prescriptions become pathetically incapable of using irrational means to effec
tive ends. "Process" techniques like freewriting and loop-writing, on the other
hand, give the irrational room to enter the process. S o we are making some
progress; and yet at bottom what is needed i s something rather more like the
thorough devotion of teachers and students to something like Ann Berthoff's
image of wri t i n g as the practice of a ful l y dialectical and psychological
Imagination. We seem not yet to have had the collective curricular courage or
rigor to meet Berthoff's call. Perhaps an understanding of the psychic patterns i n
which we work c a n encourage u s .
Ultimately, though, t h e symbol-using mortal body, aware because of i t s
symbols of both the apparent immortality o f ideas a n d i t s o w n inevitable death,
is not merely a system of cognition, a cultural construct, or an operator of rules.
It is a fragile, embodied soul i n need of understanding, and most i n need just
when i t i s asked to enter into transactions of consequence with other souls. There
is much we already know about what sorts of things these souls can do to write
better texts, but ultimately there i s no "program" for the larger purpose. We j ust
pull each other out of the cave, one Self at a time-as Plato knew. Qj
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